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EDITORIAL
Hurrah for US President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. A further whoop for the deft timing of their statement of March 14 on the open sharing of gene sequence data, which wiped millions of dollars from the market value of the quoted biotechnology sector.
To reprise: At the end of 1999, investors got the hots for genomics. Human chromosome 22 was completed; the billionth base of the human genome was sequenced; a collaboration of Celera Genomics and academics was about to publish the Drosophila genome sequence in record time.
What did it all mean? (Not much other than that.) Genomic data are terribly useful. But making money out of them will depend on using them properly, not on their simply being there. And some investors didn't understand that. The stock prices of quoted genomics companies ramped at each event, as intelligent and normally levelheaded people took their money (and ours) and, working largely on the basis of feelings and fingers in the air, used it indiscriminantly. With dot.com fever subsiding, the genomic infection spread to other quoted biotechnology companies. Companies with no direct interests in genomes-human or otherwise-happily surfed on the froth of the genomics wave. Some of them floated: $1.2 billion was raised by initial public offerings in the first quarter of 2000; another $12.5 billion was raised during that time by companies that were already quoted. By mid-March, biotechnology was financially replete.
With all this money sloshing around, biotechnology companies could have become too used to free-flowing funds: easy money pouring in has a tendency to flow out just as readily. But over the past three years or so, they have learnt the good habit of exerting stringent control on R&D spending (see p. 499).
We can be pretty certain that when Clinton and Blair urged open access to genomes, they had little inkling of the result. It was an accident that their statement, like a strong surfactant, burst the biotechnology bubble. Investors fled genomics, leaving some companies with market valuations that were only 2 or 3 (rather than 10) times their summer 1999 levels. They fled the rest of biotechnology, too. The exodus, like the ingress, was indiscriminate.
But the Clinton/Blair "blunder" was good for biotechnology. It planted companies of all stripes firmly back in reality. Chief financial officers can once again act as if the next financial harvest is years away. Even with the comfort of extended R&D budgets, research and clinical directors can resume their habits of applying stringent criteria to development programs. CEOs will continue to be circumspect in their dealings with development and marketing partners: yes, wellfunded biotechnology companies could pursue product development on their own, but would it be wise?
The partial collapse of the public biotechnology market is also good news for companies just setting out. The wiser institutional investors-those that sold biotechnology shares at the market peakwill, no doubt, be recycling some of their frothy profits through their venture arms to start-ups and spin-outs. Time to start unpicking some of those silly mergers, perhaps. Thanks, of course, to Bill and Tony.
There is, it seems, something viscerally unfair about the granting by the US Patents and Trademarks Office of patents on gene sequences. Indeed, there have been complaints about gene patenting from several academic researchers, particularly those associated with publicly funded genome efforts. In December 1999, for instance, former NIH Director Harold Varmus and NIHGR Director Francis Collins notified US PTO Commissioner Todd Dickinson that they were "very concerned with the [agency's] apparent willingness" to grant claims based on functions of genes deduced "theoretically" from sequence analysis algorithms. In March, a letter to Nature from US National Academy of Science President Bruce Alberts and Royal Society President Sir Aaron Klug reiterated these concerns, stressing that genes identified on the basis of computer search algorithms alone "should not be rewarded with a broad patent for future therapies or diagnostics."
Frankly, it is a little difficult to see what has got these scientific celebs all fired up. Their flaps appear to be predicated on a palpably false assumption: that an issued patent immediately constitutes a commercial monopoly for the patent owner.
This could hardly be less true. An issued patent gives its owner a certain amount of leverage, and that is all. Impressive intellectual property can be used to attract investment to a company, money that is essential in putting in place some of the components of a defined commercial position. But genomics patents are not impressive if cursory scientific examinations have any validity. If patents that contain claims for utility based on expression patterns or function extrapolated from sequence data alone have not impressed Drs Collins and Klug and Varmus and Alberts, they do not need to preempt decisions at the US PTO. They can simply offer themselves as expert witnesses in the trials that will ensue when the patents are challenged.
The same arguments apply for other genomic patents. Certain parts of the academic community were alarmed recently at the granting to Human Genome Sciences of a patent covering the CCR5 chemokine receptor. The patent contains a broad claim to "medical uses of CCR5, such as therapies to block or enhance the function of the receptor." HGS might think its patent encompasses an unexpected function of the receptor-its role as a binding site for HIV-and also might claim exclusive rights to commercialize potential AIDS drugs designed around CCR5. But that clearly is debatable.
We entirely favor an intellectual property system that affords a degree of protection that is commensurate with usefulness of the disclosure in a given patent. Where we differ from the good academic doctors is that we believe such a system is already in place. It is not at patent offices, but in the courts where patents are prosecuted and within commercial negotiations. These can be lengthly, costly battles. But they are the places where the real value of technical advances are determined.
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